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Settings: Linguistic Cues Affect the
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Andrea Bender * and Sieghard Beller
Department of Psychosocial Science, Faculty of Psychology, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Linguistic cues may be considered a potent tool for focusing attention on causes or
effects. In this paper, we explore how different cues affect causal assignments in German
and Tongan. From a larger screening study, two parts are reported here: Part 1 dealt
with syntactic variations, including word order (agent vs. patient in first/subject position)
and case marking (e.g., as ergative vs. non-ergative in Tongan) depending on verb type
(transitive vs. intransitive). For two physical settings (wood floating on water and a man
breaking a glass), participants assigned causality to the two entities involved. In the
floating setting, speakers of the two languages were sensitive to syntactic variations,
but differed in the entity regarded as causative. In the breaking setting, the human agent
was uniformly regarded as causative. Part 2 dealt with implicit verb causality. Participants
assigned causality to subject or object of 16 verbs presented in minimal social scenarios.
In German, all verbs showed a subject (agent) focus; in Tongan, the focus depended on
the verb; and for nine verbs, the focus differed across languages. In conclusion, we
discuss the question of domain-specificity of causal cognition, the role of the ergative as
causal marker, and more general differences between languages.
Keywords: causal cognition, causal attribution, agency, language, ergative case, implicit verb causality, culture,
Tongan and German
INTRODUCTION
Physical situations look the same all over the world. They follow invariable laws of nature and
appear to be open to direct inspection, irrespective of the culture or language of a potential observer.
But do people represent them and reason about them in the same way everywhere in the world?
While causal cognition has been subject to a great deal of exploration over the last two millennia,
specifically in philosophy and psychology (for an overview, see Waldmann and Hagmayer, 2013),
the potential for cultural and linguistic diversity has attracted far less interest (Bender et al., 2017,
for exceptions, see the contributions to Beller et al., 2014).
Previous research points to a small number of factors that—even within cultural and/or
linguistic groups—may affect causal cognition, not only in the social domain but also in the physical
domain: biases in assigning causality, specific causal concepts, and linguistic cues. The first group
of these factors generally skews the assignment of causality a priori: The causal asymmetry bias
(White, 2006), for instance, leads people to assign the roles of CAUSE and EFFECT to entities even
in symmetric interactions, and to overestimate the contribution of the assumed CAUSE entity to
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the overall interaction. Being a domain-general feature of causal
cognition, this bias affects most of what people perceive, believe,
and linguistically express with regard to causal relations, and even
restrains research questions and methods (White, 2006, 2007;
Bender and Beller, 2011). The second group of factors is restricted
to specific settings, but is still pervasive, namely the causal
theories of folk science (Keil, 2003; Lawson, 2006), including
such popular misconceptions as the impetus concept in motion
(McCloskey, 1983; Hubbard and Favretto, 2003), or the valve
model of how a thermostat functions (Kempton, 1986). They
are responsible for content effects detected, for example, with
different content versions of otherwise identical tasks (Cummins,
1995; Beller and Spada, 2003; Beller and Kuhnmünch, 2007;
Klauer et al., 2010; and see Le Guen et al., 2015). The third—
and for the purpose of this paper most relevant—group of factors
involves variations in linguistic cues that may be employed
distinctively to shift attention to cause or effect. Assignment as
prime cause may be affected, for instance, by a shift in what is
focused on as figure and what as ground (Kuhnmünch and Beller,
2005; Beller and Bender, 2015). Conveying this focus involves
language, at least as a medium, and its effectiveness thus testifies,
rather non-controversially, to an impact of language on causal
representations.
Besides such distinct cues from within a given language,
however, diverging properties of different languages might also
play a role in shifting attention in a specific manner. Cross-
linguistic studies reveal that languages differ in how they
encode information about causal relations and events (e.g.,
Ikegami, 1991; Wolff et al., 2009; Bohnemeyer et al., 2010;
Fausey and Boroditsky, 2011), but the question of whether such
language-specific grammatical features and phrasing preferences
entail cross-linguistic differences in cognitive representations of
causality has barely been investigated. We therefore attempted
to address this question by exploring the influence of two types
of linguistic cues on the assignment of causality in two non-
related languages: German, which belongs to the Indo-European
language family and serves as mother tongue to a 100 million
people, and Tongan, which belongs to the Austronesian language
family and is spoken by the approximately 100,000 inhabitants of
the Polynesian Kingdom of Tonga in the Southwest Pacific.
Mainstream research is still guided by the wide-spread
assumption that causal cognition tends to be universal,
specifically in the physical domain. Given the resultant shortage
in empirical evidence, we conducted a screening study with
the main purpose of exploring potential cultural and linguistic
impacts on causal cognition in the physical domain (Bender
and Beller, 2011). The data presented here were collected as
part of this screening, and address the question on whether
grammatical features and phrasing preferences may affect
causal representations. More specifically, we investigated within-
language effects of content domain (physical setting), verbs
and verb type (transitive vs. intransitive), and word order, but
also between-language effects of different grammatical structures
(nominative-accusative vs. absolutive-ergative). In the following,
we first provide a theoretical background on the linguistic coding
of information about causal relations and events, before we
motivate and present the current study.
LINGUISTIC CODING OF CAUSALITY
Linguistic descriptions have long been known to affect how
people represent a described event—even when they eye-
witnessed it themselves (e.g., Loftus and Palmer, 1974, and see
Fausey and Boroditsky, 2011). This is the very reason why
particular care has to be taken with regard to how inquiries are
phrased, for instance in court.
In principle, a causal relationship can be understood as an
event, caused by one entity (the causer or agent) and affecting
another entity (the effect or patient). Typically, if not necessarily,
agents are conceived of as being animate, sentient, moving,
instigating and controlling the respective action or causing the
respective event (Langacker, 1987). However, according toDowty
(1991, p. 572), agency is a prototype rather than an either-
or concept, clustered around a set of properties that include
(i) volitional involvement in the event or state, (ii) sentience
and/or perception, (iii) causation of an event or change of state
in another participant, (iv) movement relative to the position
of another participant, and (v) existence independently of the
event named by the verb. While human beings combine these
properties in a paradigmatic manner, the same set of properties
can also be recruited for assigning agent and patient roles in
non-human, entirely physical settings such as the launching
of an object by another object (Mayrhofer and Waldmann,
2014).
When translating a causal relationship into language, the
notion of causality can be linguistically encoded in numerous
ways and across different elements of a clause, for instance
in syntactic categories such as subject, in verb semantics,
in morphology, in resultative constructions, or in animacy
distinctions as coded in noun phrases (for examples, see
Duranti and Ochs, 1990; Ikegami, 1991; Wierzbicka, 2002;
Wolff and Song, 2003; Wolff, 2007; Bohnemeyer et al.,
2010). Here, we are particularly interested in two types of
linguistic variations: cues derived from the syntactic structuring
around the verb, and causal information implicit in verb
semantics.
Syntactic Structuring
The structure of a sentence is determined, at least to
a considerable extent, by its core component: the verb. For
our purpose, two types of verbs will be contrasted: transitive
verbs like “kill,” which entail subject and object, and intransitive
verbs like “die,” which entail a subject only. Mostly, although
not necessarily, the semantic roles of agent and patient figure
syntactically as subject and object, at least in active sentences. Yet,
how these syntactic roles are categorized differs across languages
(cf. Figure 1).
In nominative-accusative languages like German or English,
subjects of intransitive and transitive verbs are treated uniformly,
and are distinguished from objects of transitive verbs by their
case: nominative for the subject (i.e., der Hund [“theNOM dog”]
in S1 and der Junge [“theNOM boy”] in S2) and accusative for
the direct object (i.e., den Hund [“theACC dog”] in S2). Although
it is typically the agent who figures as the subject, this need
not be the case: The patient can also hold the subject position
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FIGURE 1 | Categorization of subject and object in nominative-accusative languages and ergative-absolutive languages, with examples from German and Tongan
(adapted from Bender and Beller, 2011).
indicated by the nominative case, for instance if the verb is
transformed into the passive voice (as with der Hund [“theNOM
dog”] in S3).
Ergative-absolutive languages like Tongan, on the other
hand, distinguish subjects of intransitive verbs from subjects
of transitive verbs (Plank, 1979; Dixon, 1994; Manning, 1996).
The former have the same grammatical case (i.e., absolutive)
as objects of transitive verbs, whereas the latter are put in the
ergative case. Therefore, 'a e kulí (“ABS the dog”) has the same
grammatical form both in S4 and S5, whereas 'e he tamasi'í (“ERG
the boy”) in S5 is highlighted with the ergative marker 'e.
From a propositional point of view, S2, S3, and the respective
ergative sentence S5 are equivalent. Yet, S3 is marked by the
passive voice (in contrast to the unmarked active voice in
S2), while its complement in an ergative-absolutive language
(S5) is marked by the ergative case of the transitive subject
(in contrast to the unmarked absolutive case of intransitive
subjects and transitive objects). In other words, nominative-
accusative languages categorize according to focus, whereas
ergative-absolutive languages categorize according to the entities
undergoing a change of state.
Only a small number of studies have so far examined
the cognitive implications of these syntactic variations. For
instance, Goldin-Meadow (2003) reports that, irrespective of
their mothers’ language, deaf children are more likely to
spontaneously produce gestures for intransitive agents and for
patients than for transitive agents, thus exhibiting an ergative
pattern. For speakers of Samoan, an ergative language closely
related to Tongan, a similar focus on intransitive agents and
patients was observed, at least in socio-political discourse
(Duranti, 1994).
Now, if speakers of ergative languages are, by default, largely
content with providing and receiving information about the
action and the entity affected, then introducing a transitive
agent and marking him or her with the ergative case by way of
exception might serve as a particularly potent tool for agency
assignment. A cross-linguistic experiment (Beller et al., 2009b)
explored this hypothesis by testing whether the ergative does
indeed shift agency assignment in a symmetric physical setting
that does not involve a “proper” semantic agent (i.e., no animate
entity). The experiment contrasted the intransitive phrasing
“wood floats on water” and the transitive passive phrasing “wood
is carried by water” in German, with respective changes in case
marking as absolutive vs. ergative in Tongan. The change from
intransitive to transitive increased the assessment of water as
causative (the agent marked by the ergative) in Tongan, but
not in German, where wood remained in the focus (Figure 2A),
suggesting that the ergative marking in Tongan may indeed
provide a stronger tool for indicating agency than its counterpart
in German.
However, due to the different structures of the languages, the
two sentences were not entirely comparable. More specifically, in
order to keep word order constant across languages, the transitive
construction in German had to be phrased with the (marked)
passive voice. Adding an (unmarked) active phrasing that allows
us to disentangle their relative effects would thus be required to
justify any strong conclusion.
Two further reservations may be raised with regard to this
previous study: First, it used a forced-choice response format,
which may have distorted responses in an unintended way.
Second, and more importantly, the floating setting is purely
physical and symmetric; assigning the thematic role of the agent
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to either entity involved may therefore be problematic. With the
data reported in this article, we aim to remedy these reservations
by comparing responses assessed using the forced-choice format
with responses assessed using an analog rating scale, and by
comparing a purely physical setting with a setting that involves
a human agent.
This latter setting also allows us to contrast agentive phrasings
with a non-agentive phrasing (Hare et al., 2009; Fausey and
Boroditsky, 2011). Agentive phrasings are typically transitive
and indicate an agent in the subject position, as in “He broke
the glass,” whereas non-agentive phrasings are intransitive, with
the entity affected (patient) in the subject position, as in “The
glass broke.” In line with related work (e.g., Ikegami, 1991),
Fausey and colleagues demonstrated that speakers of different
languages differ with regard to their preferences for agentive
vs. non-agentive phrasings (Fausey et al., 2010; Fausey and
Boroditsky, 2011), and that these preferences also affect their
causal assignments: Themore an event is described in an agentive
way, the more likely the (personal) agent will be blamed (Fausey
and Boroditsky, 2010).
Importantly, though, by virtue of its subject position, people
might be willing to consider the affected entity to be the “agent”
of the intransitive verb, andmight thus assignmore causality to it.
If this tendency is further emphasized by case marking, it should
be stronger in nominative-accusative languages, which shift “the
glass” from (accusative) object to (nominative) subject, than in
ergative-absolutive languages, in which “the glass” remains in the
absolutive case.
Implicit Verb Causality
Assigning causal roles to the entities involved in a specific relation
is likely the most relevant objective in identifying its causal
structure. While this seems to prioritize the entities as the main
source of information relevant for role assignment, the relation
itself and its linguistic representation through a specific verb
plays an equally important, albeit perhaps more subtle, role in
this process—and again, Loftus and Palmer’s (1974) classical
study on motion events may serve as a striking case in point:
Participants estimated the speed of two cars involved in an
accident differently, depending on the verb used in the target
question (e.g., “contact,” “hit,” or “smash”).
Since Abelson and Kanouse (1966) reported the phenomenon
later called “implicit verb causality,” it has been demonstrated
repeatedly that different verbs used to describe abstract
interpersonal events may give rise to different causal assignments
(for overviews, see e.g., Rudolph and Försterling, 1997; Ferstl
et al., 2011). The verb “cheat,” for instance, is conceived of
as being primarily in the responsibility of the agent, whereas
“congratulate” rather suggests that the congratulation was evoked
by the person congratulated (i.e., the patient) and by something
he or she has accomplished.
This difference in focus on subject vs. object can be used
to establish taxonomies of interpersonal verbs, first in state and
action verbs, and then further into subtypes, depending on the
underlying theory. For instance, in Au’s (1986) terminology,
“cheat,” with its subject focus, would be regarded as an action-
agent verb, whereas “congratulate” would be considered an
action-patient verb, due to its object focus (for alternative
taxonomies, see also Brown and Fish, 1983; Semin and Fiedler,
1991; Crinean and Garnham, 2006). Although this field of
research has focused on implicit causality, recent studies have
proven that verbs also differ with regard to whether they are more
likely to trigger causal or consequential inferences (Majid et al.,
2007; Pickering and Majid, 2007).
Given our primary interest in physical causality, our intention
with the study reported below was not to systematically explore
verb causality in German and Tongan (for respective studies
on German see, e.g., Fiedler and Semin, 1988; Rudolph and
Försterling, 1997), but to assess the potential for interferences
with causal assignments. The main question was whether
the verb itself, even in the absence of any concrete context
or information on the entities involved, would already shift
participants’ assignments in a language-specific manner. Due
to our focus on the physical domain, we selected verbs that
can refer to physical settings, but had no particular expectation
regarding potential cross-linguistic differences. In contrast, for
a small group of verbs referring to social contexts, we did
have reasons to expect such differences. Tongan culture places
a strong emphasis on cooperation and sharing with others
(fetokoni'aki), and granting other people their requests—within
certain limits—is regarded as a core value (Morton, 1996; Evans,
2001; Bender, 2007). The clearer a request is articulated, the more
compelling is the obligation (Beller et al., 2009a). Given this
cultural evaluation, respective transaction verbs such as “giving,”
“offering,” or “helping” may thus have a stronger object focus in
Tongan than in German.
THE STUDY
The data presented in the current article were collected as part
of a larger screening, which aimed at exploring the potential
influences of culture on causal cognition and consisted of several
sections. One section of the screening asked participants to
assign causality in a range of purely physical, symmetric settings,
varying content and focus (reported in Bender and Beller,
2011). Another section was concerned with potential linguistic
effects on causal assignments, on both the syntactic and the
semantic level (reported in this article), and a final section was
concerned with causality as cognitive determinant for emotions
(not considered here).
Methods
The two linguistic objectives of the screening, which are the
subject of the current article, will be referred to as Part 1 (syntactic
variations) and Part 2 (implicit verb causality), respectively.
The tasks in Part 1 aimed at assessing how syntactic variations
affect the assignment of causality. The prime goal was to replicate
a main finding of a previous study (Beller et al., 2009b)—namely
that ergative case marking in Tongan shifts agency assignments,
and does so more strongly than the passive transformation
in German—and to broaden the empirical basis by additional
variations and different response formats. More specifically, we
hypothesized that re-phrasing an agentive (transitive) sentence
as non-agentive (intransitive) does shift causal assignments
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TABLE 1 | Syntactic variants used in Part 1 on syntactic variations (with English translations).
Wood floating
Word order
Verb type Agent first/subject: Water (Wasser, vai) Patient first/subject: Wood (Holz, papa)
Transitive (carrying) (1) The fact that water carries wood, ...
Ge: Dass Wasser Holz trägt,...
To: ’Oku ’ave ’e he vai ’a e papa,...e
(2) The fact that wood is carried by water, ...
Ge: Dass Holz von Wasser getragen wird ...
To: ’Oku ’ave ’a e papa ’e he vai,...e
Intransitive (floating) (3) The fact that water lets wood float, ...a
Ge: Dass Wasser Holz schwimmen lässt,...
To: ’Oku tukuange ’e he vai ke tētē ’a e papa,... e
(4) The fact that wood floats on water, ...
Ge: Dass Holz auf Wasser schwimmt,...
To: ’Oku tētē ’a e papa ’i he vai,...
A glass breaking
Word order
Verb type Agent first/subject: Man (Mann, tangata) Patient first/subject: Glass (Glas, sio’ata)
Transitive (breaking1 ) (5) The fact that the man breaks the glass, ...
Ge: Dass der Mann das Glas zerbricht,...
To: ’Oku fahi ’e he tangata ’a e sio’ata,...e
(6) The fact that the glass is broken by the man, ...
Ge: Dass das Glas von dem Mann zerbrochen wird,...
To: ’Oku fahi ’a e sio’ata ’e he tangata,...e
Intransitive (breaking2 ); patient shift (7) *The fact that the glass breaks to the man, ...
b
Ge: Dass das Glas dem Mann zerbricht,...
To: Ko e hoko ’a e mafahi ’a e sio’ata ki he tangata, ...
Intransitive (breaking2 ); non-agentive (8) The fact that the glass breaks, ...
Ge: Dass das Glas zerbricht,...
To: ’Oku mafahi ’a e sio’ata,...
Ge: German; To: Tongan.
aVariant (3) somewhat strains the notion of an intransitive sentence with water as subject: Water is subject only with regard to “let,” while wood still remains the subject for the (intransitive)
“floating.” Yet, this ‘split agency’ was the very reason for including this variant.
bAlthough this phrasing would not be used in English, it is canonical in German and feasible in Tongan.
eErgative construction.
toward the non-agentive subject. This effect should occur in
both languages, but should be more pronounced in nominative-
accusative languages than in ergative-absolutive languages due
to the concurrent shift in case marking in the former but not
the latter. A second goal was to explore the effect of including
a full-fledged semantic (human) agent. We hypothesized that if
such an agent is present, this agent should strongly attract causal
assignments across other syntactic variations.
Part 2 aimed at assessing how verb semantics affect the
assignment of causality. Given that implicit verb causality has
never before been investigated for a Polynesian language like
Tongan, we also intended to probe the potential of cross-
linguistic variability in this regard. Specifically, we wanted to
explore whether verbs that could be used to describe (symmetric)
physical relations exhibit a subject or object focus in the first
place, and do so distinctively in different languages. For verbs
focusing on social events related to the Tongan obligation to help
(fetokoni'aki) we hypothesized a more pronounced object focus
than other verbs in Tongan, and more so than their German
counterparts.
Materials
Part 1: Syntactic variations
In this part, two physical settings were used: Wood floating
and a glass breaking. For each setting, four syntactic variants
were constructed by crossing verb type (transitive vs. intransitive)
and word order (agent vs. patient in first/subject position; see
Table 1).
For the floating setting, a purely physical setting without a
human agent, the following variants were used:
Transitive, agent first/subject: “Water carries wood.” (1)
Transitive, patient first/subject: “Wood is carried by water.” (2)
Intransitive, agent first/subject (split agency):
“Water lets wood float.” (3)
Intransitive, patient first/subject: “Wood floats on water.” (4)
As not all combinations of verb type and word order could
be filled with a one-verb phrasing, we decided to choose a
construction with “let” that splits agency for variant (3): Wood
serves as the subject for the (intransitive) “floating” and thus, in
a loose sense, as the agent in this specific activity, while part of
the agency is shifted to the water, which is subject with regard to
“let.” Hence, we classified this sentence as intransitive with agent
(water) in the first/subject position.
Three of the Tongan sentences required an ergative
construction: The split agency phrasing (3) and the transitive
phrasing (1), both of which emphasize the agent by word order
and subject position, but also the transitive phrasing (2) that
emphasizes the patient. The reason for this is that the passive
transformation used in English and German to implement
variant (2) is not possible in Tongan; the closest we can get is a
phrasing as in (1), yet with reversed word order (Churchward,
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1953, p. 67f.). As a consequence, the shift in word order from
(1) to (2) implies a shift in case marking in German, but not in
Tongan.
For the breaking setting, the following four variants were used,
three of which explicated a human agent:
Transitive, agent first/subject: “The man breaks the glass.” (5)
Transitive, patient first/subject:
“The glass is broken by the man.” (6)
Intransitive, patient first/subject (patient shift):
“∗The glass breaks to the man.” (7)
Intransitive, patient first/subject (non-agentive):
“The glass breaks.” (8)
One slot (intransitive verb with agent in first/subject position)
was again impossible to fill. For explorative purposes, we
therefore decided to include construction (7) with the patient
in first/subject position for which German marks the agent
by the dativus commodi case and thus reverses the typical
causal relation, indicating the man as the entity being affected.
The respective sentence was thus classified as intransitive with
patient shift. From a linguist’s point of view, the intransitive
verb still does not render “the glass” the agent; speakers of
German might nonetheless feel inclined to consider it to be
agentive to a certain extent. Note also that variant (8) mentions
the patient, but leaves the agent unnamed and is thus non-
agentive.
Two of the Tongan sentences required an ergative
construction (one, again, because the passive used in German
is not possible in Tongan): The transitive phrasing (5) in which
word order and subject position emphasized the agent, but also
the transitive phrasing (6) in which the two factors emphasized
the patient.
Assessment of causal assignments: All target items were
formulated using the following sentence frame, exemplified for
variant (1) (the complete list of syntactic variants is presented in
Table 1):
“The fact that water carries wood is basically due to ...
the water | | the wood.”
German:
“Dass Wasser Holz trägt, liegt vor allem ...
amWasser | | am Holz.”
Tongan:
“'Oku ave 'e he vai 'a e papa, ko e tupu mei ...
he vai | | he papa.”
In the floating setting, causal assignments were assessed with
an analog rating scale of 10 cm length, which allowed for the
allocation of relative causal effectiveness. Each side of the scale
was labeled with one of the two entities “the water/the wood.”
The four syntactic variants of the breaking setting were
implemented each in two assessment versions: first with a forced-
choice format that simply required participants to decide which
of the two entities in question is the main cause for the overall
event (e.g., “...  the man;  the glass.”), and second with
an analog rating scale of 10 cm length in order to assess the
relative causal effectiveness of the two entities (as in the example
above). For all variants involving a person—phrasings (5), (6),
and (7)—the entities were “the man/the glass” (German: am
Mann/am Glass; Tongan: he tangata/he sio'ata), whereas for the
non-agentive variant (8), the entities were formulated either
by referring to the glass vs. an unknown person (German: am
Glas/an jemand Unbekanntem; Tongan: he sio'ata/he tokotaha
ta'e'iloa) or by referring to the glass vs. an unknown non-
personal factor (German: an etwas Unbekanntem; Tongan: he
me'a ta'e'iloa).
Part 2: Implicit verb causality
This part aimed at assessing how the verb itself—in the
absence of any context information—affects causal assignments.
It comprised 16 verbs, which are presented in Table 2. Twelve
verbs can be used to describe physical relations; they were
examined here to assess a baseline of verb semantics for exploring
its potential influence on causal assignments. The remaining four
verbs refer to social transactions of giving and helping, which are
linked to the core value of fetokoni'aki in Tonga and are thus of
particular cultural salience.
Assessment of causal assignments: All target items were
presented as minimal social scenarios of the type “[S(Subject)] verb
[O(Object)]” as shown in the following example:
“Peter carries Anna. This is surely due to
Peter | | Anna.”
German:
“Peter trägt Anna. Das liegt sicher an
Peter | | Anna.”
Tongan:
“Fua 'e Pita 'a 'Ana. 'Oku mahino ko e tupu mei
Pita | | 'Ana.”
The roles [S] and [O] were replaced by proper names that are
common in the respective languages. Causal assignments were
assessed with an analog rating scale of 5 cm length. The subject
[S] was always placed on the left side of the scale and the object
[O] on the right side to ensure coherence with the word order in
the sentences.
Participants
The German sample consisted of 93 students from the University
of Freiburg (36 male, 56 female [1 did not indicate his or her
gender]; mean age 23.7 years, SD = 5.19, range: 18–43 years).
Compared to the data reported in Bender and Beller (2011),
we were able to extend our Tongan sample by 76 to now 179
participants, mostly students from three different high schools
(80 male, 93 female [6 did not indicate their gender]; mean age
17.5 years, SD = 3.91, range: 14–49 years). All participants were
native speakers of either German or Tongan, respectively, and
none had prior experience with these types of tasks.
Please note that, although the German participants are older
than the Tongan ones, the two samples are roughly comparable
in terms of education level, as most German participants were
shortly after the exams that qualify for university entry, while
the Tongan ones were shortly before these exams. Potential
implications of the age difference are picked up in the discussion.
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TABLE 2 | List of verbs used in Part 2 on verb semantics (with English translations).
English German Tongan
1 [S] attracts [O]. [S] zieht [O] an. Tohoaki’i ’e [S] e tokanga ’a [O].e
2 [S] interrupts [O]. [S] unterbricht [O]. Fakaheleleu ’a [S] kia [O].
3 [S] resembles [O]. [S] ähnelt [O]. To’onga tatau ’a [S] mo [O].
4 [S] repels [O]. [S] stößt [O] ab. Fakafepaki ’a [S] kia [O].
5 [S] approaches [O]. [S] nähert sich [O]. Fakaofiofi ’a [S] kia [O].
6 [S] distracts [O]. [S] lenkt [O] ab. Uesia ’e [S] e tokanga ’a [O].e
7 [S] pushes [O] forward. [S] schiebt [O] nach vorne. Teke’i ’e [S] ’a [O] ki mu’a.e
8 [S] lets [O] swim. [S] läßt [O] schwimmen. Tukuange ’e [S] ke kakau ’a [O].e
9 [S] carries [O]. [S] trägt [O]. Fua ’e [S] ’a [O].e
10 [S] stops [O]. [S] stoppt [O]. Ta’ofi ’e [S] ’a [O].e
11 [S] displaces [O]. [S] verdrängt [O]. Fetongi ’e [S] ’a [O].e
12 [S] hits [O]. [S] stößt [O] an. Tā’i ’e [S] ’a [O].e
A [S] gives [O] a book as a present. [S] schenkt [O] ein Buch. ’Oange ’e [S] ’a e tohi ko e me’a’ofa kia [O].e
B [S] gives [O] a picture. [S] gibt [O] ein Bild. Foaki ’e [S] ’a e fakatÄtātā’a [O].e
C [S] offers [O] some cake. [S] bietet [O] Kuchen an. ’Oange ’e [S] ’a e me’i keke ’a [O].e
D [S] helps [O] with the work. [S] hilft [O] bei der Arbeit. Tokoni ’a [S] kia [O] ki he ngāue.e
S, subject; O, object.
eErgative construction.
Procedure and Design
Although our university ethics board only deals with medical
research, we can confirm that we follow the Frankfurt declaration
of ethical conduct for anthropological research, which addresses
all stages of the research project from designing to reporting the
research.
The study was implemented as a paper-and-pencil
questionnaire. The questionnaire always began with general
instructions, followed by one task from the breaking setting in
forced-choice format. This task was followed by the block of
tasks on the content and focus variations reported in Bender
and Beller (2011). All subsequent tasks then used the rating
format: One task from the floating setting, a second task from the
breaking setting, and then the 16 tasks on implicit verb causality.
The final part of the questionnaire, which is not considered here,
dealt with emotions.
This order of tasks was chosen for three reasons: (a) The two
tasks from the breaking setting each participant had to work
on were separated from one another maximally in order to
minimize (trivial) transfer effects. (b) The task with the forced-
choice format always preceded those with rating format, because
the former used the more coarse-grained measure. (c) Finally,
in the succession of tasks with rating format, the task from
the floating setting was always presented before the second task
from the breaking setting, because the latter introduced a human
agent, and we tried to prevent possible carry-over effects from the
setting richer in information to the setting with less information.
The four tasks of the breaking setting with forced-choice
format varied between subjects, and the same applied for the four
tasks of the floating setting and the four tasks of the breaking
setting with rating format. All possible task combinations
were implemented, with one constraint: When participants had
received an agentive version for the first assessment of the
breaking setting, that is, phrasing (5), (6), or (7), they then did not
receive the non-agentive version (8) for the second assessment,
in order, again, to prevent possible carry-over effects from the
information-rich setting.
The order of the response options in the forced-choice
format and the orientation of the rating scale in the rating
format were balanced across conditions. In the non-agentive
version (8), half of the participants received a personal option
(“somebody unknown”) and the other half a non-personal option
(“something unknown”) as alternative to “the glass.”
The tasks of Part 2 on verb semantics (see Table 2) were
always administered after Part 1 had been completed. Participants
had to work on all 16 tasks. The physical verbs and the social
verbs were presented in blocks, with the block of physical verbs
(1–12) always preceding the block of social verbs (A to D).
Within each block, different random orders were implemented.
In total, four different sequences of tasks were used. Half of
the names used were male and the other half were female.
Moreover, for each verb, a female name figured as subject and
a male name as object for half of the time, and vice versa
for the other half. The combination of names and verbs was
randomized.
Participants were randomly assigned to the different
versions of the questionnaire. They were instructed to respond
spontaneously and were given as much time as they needed.
Results and Discussion
The data and findings are presented and discussed in the
following order: First, we analyse the data from Part 1 on
the effects of the syntactic variations and possible language
differences, beginning with the floating setting, followed by
the breaking setting. We then turn to Part 2 and compare
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FIGURE 2 | Assignment of causality in Part 1 on syntactic variations. The data presented in (A) are taken from Beller et al. (2009b, Table 1) and are included for
reasons of comparison.
implicit verb causality across languages and stimuli, before briefly
addressing some possible reservations.
Causal Assignments in the Floating Setting
Participants’ causal assignments were coded by measuring their
marks on the rating scale accurate to 0.5mm ranging from
0 cm (0% wood) when the mark was precisely on the endpoint
labeled with “water,” to 10 cm (or 100% wood) when the mark
was precisely on the endpoint labeled with “wood.” Accordingly,
values above 50% indicate a stronger causal role of the patient
(wood) and values below 50% indicate a stronger causal role of
the agent (water).
With the floating setting, we aimed at assessing effects of
syntactic variations on causality assignments within and across
two languages in a purely physical setting without a human agent.
The descriptions used either a transitive or an intransitive verb
and emphasized either the agent or the patient by word order
and subject position, respectively. Across languages, we found an
overall preference for the patient (wood) as causative in Germany
and for the agent (water) in Tonga as well as significant effects
of word order and verb type. Within languages, we found a
somewhat stronger preference for the agent if emphasized by
word order (in German) or in transitive phrasings (in Tongan)
than in the respective complementary conditions (Figure 2B1).
An analysis of variance with verb type (transitive vs.
intransitive), word order (agent vs. patient in first/subject
1Please note that part of the data in Panel (B) overlaps with Figure 2B in Bender
and Beller (2011).
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position), and language (German vs. Tongan) as independent
variables and the rating of wood-as-causative as dependent
variable (ranging from 0 to 100%) indicated a main effect of
language [F(1, 263) = 45.74; p < 0.001; ηp
2
= 0.148], of word
order [F(1, 263) = 7.04; p = 0.008; ηp
2
= 0.026], and of verb
type [F(1, 263) = 5.55; p = 0.019; ηp
2
= 0.021], without any
interactions.
Aggregated across conditions, the German participants
preferred the patient/wood as causative for the floating with
an average rating of 62.2% (95% CI: 55.0; 69.4), whereas the
Tongan participants preferred the agent/water as causative with
an average rating of 68.3% (corresponding to 31.7% wood [26.3;
36.9]). Given that the relation under consideration is physically
symmetric, implying equal contribution of the two entities,
both the Tongan and the German response patterns exhibit an
asymmetry, albeit in diverging directions. This finding is largely
consistent with previous results obtained using the forced-choice
response format (Beller et al., 2009b; Beller and Bender, 2015).
Beyond that, the two linguistic variations probed within
each language—word order and verb type—also affected causal
assignments: Emphasizing the agent by word order/subject
position resulted in a preference for the agent/water as causative
(59.0%; corresponding to 41.0% wood [95% CI: 34.7; 47.3]),
while emphasizing the patient/wood resulted in a balanced rating
centered around the midpoint of the scale (53.0% wood [46.7;
59.2]). A similar preference for the agent/water was found for
transitive verbs (58.3%; corresponding to 41.7% wood [35.4;
47.9]), while using an intransitive verb resulted in a balanced
rating (52.3% wood [46.0; 58.6]). The impact of linguistic cues is
thus not restricted to Tongan, as was observed previously (Beller
et al., 2009b, reproduced in Figure 2A).
However, word order and verb type seem to play different
roles in the two languages and to contribute differently to the
overall effects, as indicated by a separate analysis of variance
for each language: Word order played a significant role in
German [F(1, 89) = 6.71; p = 0.011; ηp
2
= 0.070], indicating a
distinctive preference for the patient/wood as causative (69.6%;
[61.6; 77.5]) if emphasized by word order/subject position, as
compared to a balanced response (54.9% wood [46.7; 62.9]) if
the agent/water was emphasized by word order/subject position.
On the other hand, verb type did not make much of a difference
[F(1, 89) = 0.99; p = 0.322; ηp
2
= 0.011]. For Tongan, the
pattern was reversed: Here, word order did not play a strong
role [F(1, 174) = 2.54; p = 0.113; ηp
2
= 0.014], whereas verb type
made a significant difference [F(1, 174) = 7.24; p = 0.008; ηp
2
=
0.040], indicating a stronger preference for the agent/water as
causative (76.1%; corresponding to 23.9% wood [15.9; 32.0]) if
phrased transitively (marked by the ergative case), as compared
to the preference for the agent/water (60.5%; corresponding to
39.5% wood [31.4; 47.6]) if phrased intransitively (absolutive
case).
The exploratory intransitive (and in Tongan partly ergative)
phrasing (3) was assumed to split agency assignment, leaving
parts of the agency with the wood (for floating) and assigning
the remainder to the water (for enabling the wood to float). And
in fact, in both languages, the causal assignment for phrasing
(3) falls between the average levels reached for the intransitive
phrasing (4) with patient (wood) in first/subject position and the
transitive phrasing (1) with agent (water) in first/subject position.
Finally, the two transitive ergative phrasings in Tongan (1 and
2) elicited, as expected, a strong preference for the agent (the
water) as causative (76.0%; corresponding to 24.0% wood) as
compared to the intransitive, non-ergative phrasing (4), which
elicited a rather balanced rating [44.9% wood; t(130) = −2.934;
p= 0.002; one-tailed].
Causal Assignments in the Breaking Setting
The breaking setting differed from the floating setting mainly
insofar as it involved a proper agent (a man) in an otherwise
physical setting (a glass breaking) in three of the four linguistic
variants. It aimed at testing whether the presence of such an
agent affects the pattern in causal assignments found in the
floating setting. The specific event was described either by
using a transitive or an intransitive construction, three of these
emphasizing the glass by word order and subject position—
phrasings (5), (6), and (7)—and one emphasizing the man (8).
Causal assignments were assessed with two different tasks per
person, the first using a forced-choice format and the second a
rating format. As can be seen in Figures 2C and D, we found
a uniform preference for the human agent as causative for all
agentive phrasings in both languages, and a difference only for
the non-agentive phrasing (8), which elicited a rather balanced
assessment in German and a strong focus on the unknown agent
or entity.
Forced-choice data
In a preliminary step, we checked for the non-agentive
variant (8) whether it made a difference how the response
option that was provided as alternative to the glass was
formulated: personal as “somebody unknown” or non-personal
as “something unknown.” This was not the case. A log-linear
analysis (Kennedy, 1992) with response type (personal vs. non-
personal) and language (German vs. Tongan) as independent
variables and the frequency of the two response options “glass” vs.
“somebody/something else” as dependent variable indicated only
amain effect of language (G2[1]= 22.22; p< 0.001), and no other
effects (all G2[1] < 2.00; p > 0.156). We therefore regarded it as
justified to aggregate the data across these two types of response
options for the further analysis.
Similar to the floating setting, the event was described using
transitive vs. intransitive constructions, but this time, we had
three versions that emphasized the glass (by word order and
subject position) and only one that emphasized the man. To test
the four syntactic variants for differences, we therefore performed
a log-linear analysis with only the two independent variables
syntactic variation (phrasings 5, 6, 7, vs. 8) and language (German
vs. Tongan), and the frequency of the two response options
“glass” vs. “the man/somebody else/something else” as dependent
variable. The results indicated a main effect of the syntactic
variation (G2[3] = 22.74; p < 0.001), a main effect of language
(G2[1] = 11.50; p < 0.001), and an interaction of the two factors
(G2[3]= 10.70; p= 0.013).
Participants largely preferred the agent/the man and not the
patient/the glass as causative albeit to a differing extent across the
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four syntactic variations: phrasing (5) 10.7% glass; phrasing (6)
11.7% glass; phrasing (7) 10.3% glass; phrasing (8) 35.4% glass
(see Figure 2C). The two main effects primarily resulted from
a difference for the non-agentive phrasing (8) across samples,
as indicated by the significant interaction: While most Tongan
participants still regarded an (unknown) agent/factor as causative
in this condition (18.0% glass; 82.0% unknown factor), the
majority of the German participants now attributed the breaking
of the glass to the glass itself (65.7% glass; 34.3% unknown factor).
Rating data
Participants’ causal assignments were coded by measuring their
marks on the scale accurate to 0.5mm, ranging from 0 cm (0%
glass), when the mark was precisely on the endpoint labeled
with “the man” or “somebody/something unknown,” to 10 cm
(or 100% glass), when the mark was precisely on the endpoint
labeled with “the glass.” Accordingly, values above 50% indicate a
stronger causal role of the patient/the glass and values below 50%
indicate a stronger causal role of the (possible) agent/the man or
somebody/something unknown.
Again, we checked in a preliminary step for the non-agentive
variant (8) whether responses depended on how the alternative
response option to the glass was formulated: personal or non-
personal. This was not the case. An analysis of variance with
response type (personal vs. non-personal) and language (German
vs. Tongan) as independent variables and the rating of glass-
as-causative as dependent variable indicated only a main effect
of language [F(1, 95) = 17.80; p < 0.001; η
2
p = 0.158], and
no other effects [all F(1, 95) < 1.0; p > 0.521; η
2
p < 0.004].
We therefore regarded it as justified to aggregate the data
across these two types of response options for the further
analysis.
To test the four syntactic variants for differences, we
performed an analysis of variance with two independent
variables, syntactic variation (phrasings 5, 6, 7, vs. 8) and language
(German vs. Tongan), and the rating of glass-as-causative as
dependent variable. The results indicated a main effect of
syntactic variation [F(1, 263) = 4.46; p = 0.004; η
2
p = 0.048]
and an interaction with language [F(1, 263) = 4.67; p = 0.003;
ηp
2
= 0.051], while the main effect of language did not reach
significance [F(1, 263) = 3.14; p= 0.078; ηp
2
= 0.012].
Similarly to the forced-choice data, yet slightly less extremely,
participants mostly preferred the agent (the man) and not the
patient (the glass) as causative, albeit to a differing extent across
the four syntactic variations: phrasing (5) 21.6% glass [95% CI:
13.1; 30.1]; phrasing (6) 25.4% glass [16.9; 34.0]; phrasing (7)
20.4% glass [11.9; 28.9]; phrasing (8) 37.1% glass [30.7; 43.6]
(see Figure 2D). Bonferroni-corrected comparisons between the
four syntactic variations did not indicate any difference (all ps >
0.167). Assignment of causality to the breaking glass was again
highest for the non-agentive version (8), and this effect was again
due to the German participants, as indicated by the significant
interaction.
Summary
With one exception, German and Tongans alike assigned prime
causality to the person involved and not to the object. Similarly,
with one exception, none of the linguistic variations had any
effect. The exception to both overall patterns is the non-agentive
phrasing (8) which led a substantial proportion of our German
participants to switch their causal assignment from the human
agent to the patient, while it did not affect the response of
our Tongan participants at all. This latter finding implies that
ergativity had no effect in this case. The German pattern is
thus consistent with findings reported by Fausey and Boroditsky
(2010), in which a non-agentive phrasing also decreased causal
assignment to the agent by English speakers.
At first glance, the German pattern is also consistent with
our assumption put forward above that shifting the patient (i.e.,
the glass) to the subject position in phrasing (8), marked by
the nominative case in German, may endow it with agent-like
properties and hence be responsible for this switch in causal
assignment. This interpretation is weakened, however, by the
results of phrasing (7) with patient shift. The German version of
phrasing (7) preserves the intransitive structure of (8) together
with the linguistic marking of “the glass” as subject in the
nominative case, but simply adds “theman” as the person affected
by the breaking of the glass. This addition of (actually irrelevant)
information suffices to switch the causal assignment “back to
normal,” hence rendering the man as the cause (for related effects
of additional yet irrelevant information on causal assignments,
see also Beller and Bender, 2015). In other words, mentioning a
possible agent, even if not in a linguistically prominent position,
appears to shift agency assignment in German toward this
candidate2.
Comparison of Verb Causality across Languages and
Stimuli
Part 2 aimed at exploring language-specific effects of verb
semantics on causal assignments, which would also allow us to
assess possible interferences of verb semantics with the syntactic
effects addressed in other parts of the survey. To this end,
participants were asked to assign causality on a rating scale for
minimal social scenarios based on different verbs. The first group
of items consisted of 12 verbs that can be used to describe physical
settings (see Table 2, 1–12). The second group consisted of four
verbs referring to social transactions, which are highly valued
in Tongan culture (Table 2, A to D). The goal of this task was
exploratory in nature, and we assumed that the social verbs are
more likely inclined toward an object focus in Tongan than in
German.
The causal assignments were coded bymeasuring participants’
marks on the rating scale accurate to 0.5 mm ranging from 0
cm (0% object) when the mark was precisely on the endpoint
labeled with the name of the person in the subject position, to
2Actually, the non-agentive phrasing (8) had also mentioned a possible agent,
albeit only indirectly through the two response options given: Half of the
participants were offered a choice between “the glass” and “something unknown”
(two non-personal options), and the other half were offered a choice between
“the glass” and “somebody unknown,” with the latter providing a personal
option. However, the different response options did not affect participants’ causal
assignments (as indicated by the preliminary analyses), and the option “somebody
unknown” did not prime our German participants toward assuming this person to
be the prime cause to the same extent as did the other phrasings.
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FIGURE 3 | Assignment of causality in Part 2 on verb causality.
5 cm (or 100% object) when the mark was precisely on the
endpoint labeled with the name of the person in the object
position. Accordingly, values above 50% indicate a stronger
causal role of the patient/object and values below 50% indicate
a stronger causal role of the agent/subject. As indicated in
Figure 3, participants’ causal assignments varied with the verb,
but differently across the two languages.
To test effects of implicit verb causality, an analysis of variance
was performed with the independent variable language (German
vs. Tongan) and a repeated measurement across the ratings of
the 16 verbs. The results indicated main effects of the factors
language [F(1, 247) = 15.75; p < 0.001; ηp
2
= 0.060] and verb
[F(13.5, 3337.1; Greenhouse − Geisser corrected degrees of freedom) = 10.80;
p < 0.001; ηp
2
= 0.042], and an interaction of the two factors
[F(13.5, 3337.1) = 11.68; p < 0.001; ηp
2
= 0.045].
In general, both German and Tongan participants revealed a
subject focus, albeit in different proportions: It was stronger for
the German participants who assigned less responsibility to the
person in the object position (35.5% [95% CI: 32.0; 39.0]) than
the Tongan participants (44.3% [41.7; 47.1]). In addition, there
was variation across the 16 verbs with ratings for the object as
causative ranging from 28.2% ([23.8; 32.6]) for “interrupt” to
49.8% ([45.1; 54.6]) for “displace,” but the causal assignments
for the verbs interacted with language. In the German sample,
the assignments for all verbs were significantly below 50%, thus
indicating a subject focus [largest t(92) = −2.014; p = 0.047;
one-sample t-test; two-tailed]. In the Tongan sample, three verbs
showed a significant object focus with assignments larger than
50% [“stop,” “displace,” and “hit”; smallest t(176) = 2.446; p =
0.015], four verbs showed balanced assignments not significantly
different from 50% [“carry,” “gives,” “offers,” and “helps (work)”;
largest |t(174)|= 1.901; p= 0.059], whereas all other verbs showed
a significant subject focus [largest t(175) =−3.102; p= 0.002].
For six verbs of the first group, a subsequent t-test indicated
cross-linguistic differences [smallest |t(266)| = 2.541; p = 0.012;
two-tailed]. The verbs “attract” and “interrupt” showed a stronger
subject focus in Tongan than in German, whereas the verbs
“carry,” “stop,” “displace,” and “hit” showed an object focus
in Tongan, but a subject focus in German. This finding is
particularly noteworthy, as each of these latter four verbs would
likely be considered an action-agent verb according to Au’s (1986)
terminology. This raises the question of whether the verbs entail
different connotations across languages as part of their semantic
meaning, or whether culture- and/or language-specific concepts
additionally affect the interpretation of (otherwise similar) words.
For the remaining six verbs of this group, no linguistic differences
were found [largest |t(260)|= 1.273; p= 0.204; two-tailed].
Previous research in Tonga had suggested that giving and
helping are considered as a response to what another person
needs or requests, and may thus entail a stronger object focus in
Tongan than in German. And indeed, the ratings for three out
of the four respective verbs (“give,” “offer,” and “help”) differed
significantly across languages. In each case, the German verb
shows a subject focus, whereas its Tongan counterpart had a
tendency toward the object [smallest |t(267)| = 2.532; p = 0.006;
one-tailed]. The ratings for the fourth verb “gives [as a present]”
did not differ [t(265) = −0.640; p = 0.261; one-tailed]. Although
the effects of cultural value are weaker than we expected them
to be, these findings do provide good reasons to devote more
attention to such effects in future research.
Finally, not all Tongan translations of transitive German
verbs are transitive themselves. Roughly two thirds of the verbs
scrutinized in Part 2 require the ergative for the subject (e.g.,
“hit”: Ta'i 'e [S] 'a [O]), while the remainder entail a prepositional
construction (e.g., with kia, “to/toward,” as in Fakaheleleu 'a
[S] kia [O], “[S] interrupts [O]”). Do those verbs that require
a subject in the ergative exhibit a stronger subject focus than
those that do not require the ergative? While our list of verbs
is neither comprehensive nor representative enough to justify
broad generalizations, the results still reveal a pattern, but the
trend is contrary to what we expected: Overall, the verbs requiring
an ergative construction not only have a stronger focus on the
object than their German counterparts, but also a stronger such
tendency than the verbs that require a prepositional construction.
The case of “carry” is particular interesting in this regard,
as it is the one verb that allows a comparison across Parts
1 and 2. While in Part 2, the abstract test of verb semantics
suggests that “carry” evokes a subject focus in German and
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tends to evoke an object focus in Tongan, the assignments for
“water carries wood” (phrasing [1] in Part 1) exhibited the
opposite pattern: Here, Tongan participants were more strongly
inclined to assign causality to the subject/water and German
participants to the object/wood. In other words, the causality
implicit in the verb “carry” has likely dampened a cross-linguistic
difference in causal assignments that otherwise may have been
even more pronounced. It is thus imperative that future work on
causal scenarios, and especially so cross-linguistic research, takes
implicit verb causality into consideration.
Possible Limitations of the Study
As mentioned above, the data reported here was part of a
larger screening study, which may have two critical implications.
First due to the exploratory purpose of the study, we did not
scrutinize strong hypotheses, but were interested in probing
the potential for cultural influences (including influences by
linguistic properties) on causal cognition in the physical domain,
where previous research has almost entirely neglected such
a potential. Our findings are therefore preliminary and an
indication of, rather than strong evidence for, such influences
in the physical domain. Second, the fact that the tasks reported
here were part of a larger study also implied limitations with
regard to the number of items that could be tested and the
number of permutations that were possible. This constrains the
generalizations we can draw form our findings. For the sake of
feasibility of the whole study, for instance, we dispensed with
a second version of the floating setting with a forced-choice
format, as we already had partial data on it, and we dispensed
with a more complete permutation of the content variations.
As a consequence, only tentative inferences can be drawn from
comparing the different settings on floating and breaking and
their response format (Figure 2).
Yet, while both, the shortness in strong hypotheses and the
limited comparability across conditions, prevent us from drawing
straightforward inferences, the data presented here still suggest
that causal cognition in the physical domain is susceptible to
cultural and linguistic influences, hence justifyingmore thorough
and in-depth investigations in this direction. Such future research
should then also investigate more thoroughly the manner in
which these linguistic factors are affecting causal assignment (e.g.,
by casing, word order, or grammatical hierarchy).
In addition, one of the reviewers raised the question
of whether our tasks may reveal more about language
comprehension of our participants than about their cognitive
processing of the scenario. In the classical study by Loftus
and Palmer (1974), for example, participants’ verbally reported
memories of an event could be compared to the actually observed
event as an objective reference, thus allowing for a strong
test of how language may bias recall. In contrast, our own
study integrated event information in the task to be conducted,
couching this information in terms that already contain the
linguistic cues under scrutiny. In other words, participants
may have simply responded to the question by reflecting the
presumptive meaning of phrasings like “carries” vs. “lets float”
in their ratings (for an overview on presumptive meanings, see
McCawley, 1978; Levinson, 2000). Yet, even if they did simply
respond to the presumptive meaning conveyed by the linguistic
cues, this would still be an interesting finding as it revealed
that the underlying concept of, for instance, why wood floats
on water is susceptible to such modification. Comparing across
different variants of a task (for tasks of the same content) and
across different content (for variants of the task) still allows us
to disentangle effects of linguistic cues and of content at least
to some extent. And indeed, the effects observed here did not
simply reflect the linguistic cues, but additionally depended on
the content of the scenario.
Another concern with the study arises from the differences in
average age between the samples. For two reasons, we do not
consider this critical. The first reason is that formal education
does not prevent people from falling prey to the asymmetry
bias (White, 2006, 2007). In the tasks we used here, the older
German participants exhibited similar degrees of asymmetry as
the younger Tongan participants although not always in the
same direction. Second, the data on the floating setting presented
in Figure 2 were actually collected with two different samples,
the rating data (Figure 2B) in the study reported here and the
forced-choice data (Figure 2A) in a previous study (Beller et al.,
2009b). The German participants in that previous study were
as young as the Tongan ones in the current study; still, their
response pattern was similar to the (older) German participants
in the current study and significantly different from the Tongan
participants of the same age.
A final concern revolves around the translatability of the
material and raises the question of whether, for instance, the
verbs used really mean the same in the two languages under
scrutiny. This concern is fueled by the findings from Part 2 on
implicit verb causality, which indicated substantial differences in
causal assignments even in the absence of context information.
If, however, a verb invites causal assignment to the agent in
one language, yet to the patient in another, the two may entail
different connotations as part of their semantics, and hence may
not be equivalent in meaning. This implication of our findings
deserves to be taken seriously in future research in this field.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The prime objective of the study reported here was to explore
whether and how language per se may affect causal cognition in
the physical domain, and how differences between languages may
come to bear on these effects. Three potentially relevant factors
were targeted: (i) syntactic structure, (ii) the presence or absence
of a full-fledged semantic agent, and (iii) the causality implicit in
verb semantics. Despite the exploratory nature of the screening,
the findings presented here still point toward intra- and cross-
linguistic effects on causal assignments that are both interesting
and important.
In the floating setting without agent, both speakers of German
and of Tongan exhibit biases in their causal assignments, but in
diverging directions, with German speakers favoring the patient
and Tongan speakers favoring the agent, thus largely replicating a
pattern found earlier (Beller et al., 2009a). These assignments are
susceptible to syntactic cues such as transitive constructions and
prior position in word order. In the breaking setting involving
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 July 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1093
Bender and Beller Language and Causal Assignments in Physical Settings
an animate agent, on the other hand, speakers of German and
Tongan alike assign agency primarily to the agent, and almost
irrespective of linguistic cueing—except for the non-agentive
phrasing (8), for which speakers of German again shift toward the
non-agent. And finally, while almost half of the verbs considered
here do share implicit notions of causality across languages,
thereby triggering similar causal assignments, the other half differ
significantly, exhibiting a stronger object or patient focus on
average in Tongan than in German, and more so for the “social”
than for the “physical” verbs.
In the following, we discuss these main findings with respect
to three issues: the domain-specificity of causal cognition, the
ambiguous role of the ergative, and more general differences
between languages.
Physical vs. Social Settings:
How Dependent Are Effects on Content
Domain?
A popular assumption, particularly among developmental
psychologists, holds that causal cognition is domain-specific
(e.g., Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007;
and see Morris and Peng, 1994). However, the extent to which
causal assignments in the physical domain differ from those in
the social domain on principle grounds is still subject to debate.
For instance, while attribution biases appear to occur both in
social (Gilbert and Malone, 1995; Norenzayan and Nisbett,
2000) and physical scenarios (Peng and Knowles, 2003; White,
2006, 2007; Beller et al., 2009b; Bender and Beller, 2011), it
has remained unclear whether these two are in fact equivalent
(Malle, 1999; Sabini et al., 2001; White, 2006). The involvement
of agents complicates matters even further: Whereas physical
settings typically involve inanimate objects, the occurrence of a
full-fledged animate agent is normally restricted to social or at
least mixed settings. This has serious implications: First, with
an agent, there is typically an inherent and strong asymmetry
between participants in a state of affairs (e.g., someone hits
someone, someone breaks something). How these thematic
roles can be applied to symmetric relations that are at stake in
most physical interactions has thus remained an unresolved
question until recently (Mayrhofer and Waldmann, 2014). And
second, if animate beings or even social actors are involved,
they might attract more responsibility ascription per se than
inanimate objects due to their greater causal effectiveness and
self-reflexiveness (Leslie, 1996). This could also explain why
a comparison of verb causality for interpersonal events and
physical transfer events revealed significant differences (Majid
et al., 2007).
In each of the two parts of our study, the two domains
were compared at least indirectly. Although both the floating
setting and the breaking setting of Part 1 on syntactic variations
deal with physical situations and thus do not allow for strong
conclusions across domains, the introduction of a proper agent in
the breaking setting adds a different quality. And although some
of the differences between the two tasks may be content-specific,
at least the following aspects are noteworthy: First, striking cross-
linguistic differences occurred across the board in the floating
setting, but not in the breaking setting, where the two groups
differed for one syntactic variation only. And second, while
linguistic variations did have an effect in the floating setting, even
if rather weak, this effect largely disappeared (again with one
exception) in the breaking setting.
These differences can be explained in reference to the personal
agent and in a related manner. The floating setting describes
a symmetric physical relation, and although people tend not
to perceive the symmetry (White, 2007)—with perception
apparently being skewed by culture-specific concepts (Bender
and Beller, 2011)—it may still trigger a sensation of ambiguity
in at least some of the participants. In such a state, additional
cues would be considered helpful to resolve the ambiguity and
to come to a decision. The breaking setting, on the other hand, is
causally more structured a priori, as it involves an animate agent.
In this case, no ambiguity arises that would have to be resolved by
linguistic cues; the social domain simply dominates the physical
domain.
This may even be true for the exceptional case (8) for which
the German participants assigned responsibility to the glass
(rather than an unknown agent). As suggested by one of the
reviewers, this specific sentencemay have invoked notions related
to a property of glasses, namely that they break easily, rather than
notions related to a specific event.While such a property notion is
more likely evoked by sentences that use the indefinite noun and
a modified verb (as in “Glas bricht leicht” = glass breaks easily),
the phrasing chosen here is still compatible with such a reading.
The findings of Part 2 on verb causality are more difficult
to interpret in this respect. Our selection of verbs is somewhat
skewed in comparison to the range that is typically explored
in these kinds of studies because the prime goal of this part
was to collect data on verb causality for verbs that can be
used to describe physical relations. Furthermore, the tasks were
implemented as minimal social scenarios, in line with the
tradition in this field of research. Even if only minimally social,
this social framing is not sufficiently abstract to prevent content
effects (Majid et al., 2007), and it prevents inferences on how
these verbs would have behaved in a purely physical context.
Another consequence of the testing in minimal social scenarios
was that some verbs shifted in meaning when transferred from
the physical to the social domain. For instance, the German
verb anziehen (“to attract”)—besides inviting the meaning of
“to dress”—refers to different events depending on whether the
entities involved are celestial bodies like earth and moon or are
human beings, where the term gains a distinctively emotional
aspect. In order to be able to address questions of domain-
dependence in verb semantics, better controlled experiments are
clearly needed in future research.
Agent vs. Patient Focus:
The Ambiguous Role of the Ergative
The main assumption behind our interest in effects of syntactic
cues was that differences in the relational structure of languages
may affect causality assignment; more specifically, speakers of
an ergative language may pay more attention to agents that are
marked by the ergative. Previous work examining speakers of an
ergative language (Duranti, 1994), linguistically untrained deaf
children (Goldin-Meadow, 2003), and eye movements of adult
English speakers (Griffin and Bock, 2000) indicated that a patient
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focus, as inherent in ergative languages, may be a default bias both
in attention and language production (Goldin-Meadow, 2003, p.
517): Action or event and the entity directly affected by it attract
most of the attention, while agent information is an optional add-
on. If, by default, speakers of an ergative language are generally
used to receiving information about the action and the entity
affected, then introducing a (transitive) agent and marking him
or her with the ergative case by way of exception should serve as
a particularly potent tool for agency assignment. This is, in fact,
what has been observed, for instance in socio-political discourse
in Samoa (Duranti, 1994). The observation that, on average,
our Tongan participants assigned causality largely—and more
strongly so than the German participants—to the agent in each of
the two settings (i.e., to the water in the floating setting, and to the
man or something/somebody unknown in the breaking setting)
would be in line with this hypothesis.
Further support was provided by a study on physical settings,
where a change from an intransitive description (phrasing [4]
“wood floats on water”) to a transitive phrasing with the water
in the ergative (phrasing [2] “wood is carried by water”) shifted
causal assignments among our Tongan participants more toward
the water (Figure 2A; Beller et al., 2009b). This pattern could
be replicated, by and large, in the current study (Figure 2B)—
although not any longer exclusively for the Tongan speakers,
but now also for the German speakers with their non-ergative
language. Across the two languages, however, the same effect may
also be accounted for by changes in word order, which prevents
us from drawing strong conclusions on exactly which linguistic
cue is responsible for the shift in assignment.
Moreover, the pattern described above could not be replicated
in the breaking setting, where the obvious presence of an agent
apparently eliminated the seductive effect of a (rather subtle)
linguistic cue such as the ergative. Here, it seems as if the default
focus on event and patient in ergative languages immunizes
their speakers against the adding of information about the agent.
Nominative-accusative languages like German, on the other
hand, override the patient focus with their accusative structure
and may thus sensitize their speakers to the presence or absence
of agency information.
The pattern observed for implicit verb causality seems to
suggest an interaction with the ergative, but in the opposite
direction, with those verbs which afford an ergative phrasing
being even more strongly object-focused on average than those
which do not afford an ergative. However, the sample of items
was non-representative and certainly too small to draw strong
conclusions from the findings.
Given this mixed pattern of findings, it is difficult to decide
whether the presence or absence of ergative case-marking in
a given phrasing is actually strong enough a cue to increase
or decrease the likelihood of assigning causal power to the
agent. Currently, the data from the floating setting—which, with
its symmetric configuration and the experimental variation of
linguistic cues, can be considered the most informative task for
this question—seems to support the former interpretation rather
than the latter. Beyond these intra-linguistic cues, however, it
seems still plausible that the relational structure of the language
(e.g., whether agents of transitive constructions are singled out by
specific case marking) may increase the salience of agency as one
of their relevant properties.
Across Languages (and Cultures):
How Diverse Is Causal Cognition?
Teasing apart the influences of culture and language on cognition
is by no means a trivial undertaking. Not only is language
an essential and integral part of culture, which bedevils any
attempt to conceptually distinguish the two; it is also challenging
to separate them methodologically (Beller et al., 2015; Iliev
and Ojalehto, 2015). With the tasks used here, for instance,
it is almost impossible to assess whether the stronger object
focus on average for the socially salient transactions in Tongan
is caused by the cultural value linked to these transactions
or whether it has become part of the semantics of the verb.
The situation is somewhat clearer with regard to the causal
assignments for the physical settings, were the difference between
samples (cultural groups) is greater than the difference between
conditions (linguistic cues). This does not, however, resolve the
question of whether the differences between samples are based
on linguistic encoding or cultural entrenching in the first place. In
other words, while the relational structure of one’s language may
affect how people perceive or assign agency, we cannot currently
rule out that their respective tendencies are also, or perhaps
exclusively so, shaped by culture-specific concepts linked to the
setting under scrutiny.
This conceptual question aside, at least some general
conclusions with regard to diversity and universality in causal
cognition can still be drawn (cf. Beller et al., 2014). Across the
board, we found both shared and distinct patterns. The two
groups resemble each other in that they exhibit biases when
assigning causality in the symmetric floating setting, in that (and
in how) they respond to linguistic cues, and in most assignments
of causality in the breaking setting. They differ in the direction
of some of these biases, for instance in the floating setting (for
other scenarios, see also Bender and Beller, 2011), in how they
interpret non-agentive phrasings in the breaking setting, and in
how they assign agency in some of the minimal social scenarios.
While the similarities seem to support assumptions on general
reasoning tendencies (e.g., White, 2006, 2007), the subtle yet
pervasive differences between the two groups also point toward a
susceptibility of these tendencies to external influences. Given the
linguistic variations in Part 1 of our study, for instance, it appears
likely that culture-specific schemas of agency and causation shift
the focus of attention either more toward the agent or more
toward the patient.
Currently, no available theoretical approach is able to account
for this. The proto-agency theory (Dowty, 1991; Mayrhofer and
Waldmann, 2014), for instance, identifies a set of properties on
which agency assignment may be based. This might account for
the similar patterns in the breaking setting, where “the man”
garners three of these properties (i.e., independent existence,
sentience/perception, and causation of a change of state), while
the scenario remains silent on the other two (volition and
movement). It may even be compatible with the difference for the
non-agentive scenario (phrasing [8] “the glass breaks”), namely
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when assuming that participants differ in whether or not they
imagine a person as part of the scenario. However, the proto-
agency theory cannot (yet) explain the cultural differences in the
floating setting, where the causal assignments of German and
Tongan speakers co-vary with the manipulations in linguistic
cues, but generally differ in the entity on which they focus as
mainly causative. For a better understanding of such cultural
influences, we thus not only require more empirical data, but also
advancement in theoretical models (Beller and Bender, 2017).
CONCLUSION
Despite the relevance of causal cognition as a core topic for the
cognitive sciences, previous research has paid only incidental
attention to culture as a possibly constitutive factor (Bender et al.,
2017)—a desideratum that is only slowly being addressed (e.g.,
by the contributions to Beller et al., 2014). In the two parts of
the screening study reported here, we intended to explore the
potential for cultural and linguistic influences by addressing two
related questions: Are assignments of causal role domain-specific
(by contrasting settings that do vs. do not involve a human
agent), and are they affected by emphasis on the conceptual
agent (by varying linguistic cues related to agency)? Our
findings suggest that such linguistic cues do affect how people
represent and explain causal facts and events, but that language-
specific properties may also contribute to differences in people’s
responses. Assumptions about the mechanisms generating these
differences are necessarily tentative, as the study was exploratory
and its design did not warrant conclusive inferences. One of the
questions still open for future research is whether what we found
primarily reflects what people perceive vs. what they express.
The most important contribution of the current study to the
field is therefore that it has demonstrated the susceptibility of
causal cognition to cultural and linguistic influences, even in the
physical domain, and that it has identified some of the factors
worth investigating more thoroughly.
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